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Achieving Economic and Environmental
Sustainabilities in Urban Consolidation
Center With Bicriteria Auction
Stephanus Daniel Handoko, Hoong Chuin Lau, and Shih-Fen Cheng, Member, IEEE
Abstract— Consolidation lies at the heart of the last-mile logis-
tics problem. Urban consolidation centers (UCCs) have been set
up to facilitate such consolidation all over the world. To the best of
our knowledge, most—if not all—of the UCCs operate on volume-
based fixed-rate charges. To achieve environmental sustainability
while ensuring economic sustainability in urban logistics, we
propose, in this paper, a bicriteria auction mechanism for the
automated assignment of last-mile delivery orders to transport
resources. We formulate and solve the winner determination
problem of the auction as a biobjective programming model.
We then present a systematic way to generate the Pareto frontier
to characterize the tradeoff between achieving economic and
environmental sustainabilities in urban logistics. Finally, we
demonstrate that our proposed bicriteria auction produces the
solutions that significantly dominate those obtained from the
fixed-rate mechanisms. Our sensitivity analysis on the willingness
of carriers to participate in the UCC operation reveals that higher
willingness is favorable toward achieving greater good for all, if
UCC is designed to be nonprofit and self-sustaining.
Note to Practitioners—One of the main issues with last-mile
logistics is the low utilization of delivery trucks, resulting in
unnecessarily large number of trucks carrying out the last-
mile delivery. This creates congestion, worsens air pollution,
and drives up the cost of the individual carriers. Consolidation
of orders can reduce the total number of trucks used to
perform the last-mile delivery. This can considerably improve
the environmental sustainability around the delivery area and
reduce the cost of the individual carrier. Without the proper
mechanism, however, such consolidation is often not economi-
cally sustainable, requiring the government to continually inject
subsidy. To address the issue, we propose, in this paper,
a bicriteria auction that considers both the economic and
environmental sustainability aspects when performing winner
determination. We then present a systematic way to characterize
the tradeoff between the two objectives. Finally, we show that
our proposal leads to the solutions that dominate those obtained
from the commonly used fixed-rate mechanisms.
Index Terms— Environmental economics, logistics, multi-agent
systems, sustainable development, urban pollution.
I. INTRODUCTION
URBAN or last-mile logistics involves the movement offreight in urban cities. Consolidation and coordination
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lie at the heart to solve the last-mile logistics problems [1],
since they are capable of increasing truck utilization and
reducing total distance traveled. This in turn brings about
greater cost effectiveness with fewer man-hours and less fuel
consumption and more environmental friendliness with less air
pollution and congestion in urban areas [2], [3].
Urban consolidation centers (UCCs) [4] (or city distribution
centers) are facilities that enable the consolidation and coor-
dination of last-mile deliveries in a number of cities around
the world. Inbound freight from different carriers arrive at
the UCC is first sorted according to their destinations. Orders
are then consolidated based on destinations so as to achieve
efficient and coordinated deliveries within cities. UCCs can be
generally divided into two categories: as facility providers or
service providers.
When a UCC serves as a facility provider, it provides cross-
docking functionality for the participating carriers. The cost
savings obtained are finally shared among the carriers. As a
result, higher truck utilization is attained, fewer trucks are
required, and lower total delivery cost is incurred. The wait
time incurred by carriers assigned to carry out the consolidated
last-mile deliveries is compensated by the savings attained by
those carriers that no longer need to enter the city center.
A fair allocation of the savings needs to be agreed among
the participating carriers in order to ensure participation. The
Tenjin Joint Distribution System in Fukuoka, Japan, is an
example of this type of UCCs.
In another context, a UCC may serve as a service provider
with its own fleet of vehicles. These UCCs carry out last-
mile deliveries on behalf of the participating carriers at a fee.
Occasionally, the UCCs may be government initiatives or pilot
runs and provide the last-mile delivery service free of charge.
Participating carriers simply drop off their loads at the UCCs
and pay to get the loads delivered into the city center. The
examples of these UCCs are La Petite Reine in Paris, France,
the Westfield Consolidation Centre in London, U.K., and the
Binnenstadservice in Nijmegen, The Netherlands. By using
the UCCs’ service, the participating carriers no longer need
to enter the city center. Retaining the use of large trucks for
the economies of scale outside the city center thus becomes
possible in the case of government’s restrictions on the allowed
types of vehicles within the city center.
In this paper, we are concerned with UCCs that serve as
a service provider. To the best of our knowledge, most—if
not all—existing UCCs operate on volume-based fixed-rate
charges. That is, UCCs set various rates per unit volume for
using its service to deliver to different areas in the city center.
1545-5955 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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Participating carriers submit their requests for consolidation
and are charged according to the rates set by the UCCs.
In economic terms, the carriers are price takers.
One challenge in operating UCCs as a service is economic
sustainability. To maintain profitability, a UCC should adopt a
market-based approach by charging deliveries according to the
rates determined by market demands rather than fixed rates.
However, determining the optimal rates to charge carriers is,
however, not straightforward, since the potential cost savings
perceived by different carriers vary and are not normally
known to the UCC. Setting the rates too low, the UCCs could
miss the opportunity to maximize the profit. On the other hand,
the UCCs could lose potential customers by setting them too
high, which eventually leads to reduced profit.
Auctions have been used for thousands of years as mar-
ket mechanisms. Today, auctions account for an enormous
amount of economic activity: governments use auctions to
sell treasury bills, radio frequency spectrums, and other assets
such as firms to be privatized. Similarly, firms select their
suppliers through procurement auctions. For end consumers,
houses, cars, antiques, artwork, and agricultural products
are commonly sold through auctions. The Internet auction
Web sites, such as Ebay, are used to sell almost anything.
Auctions are simple but effective price discovery mechanisms
to extract buyers’ or sellers’ valuations, especially when there
is uncertainty about the value of an object or service.
Motivated by this, [5] proposed a profit-maximizing auction
mechanism for the UCCs. Their proposed mechanism are
based on operational costs, which comprise delivery and
storage costs. The delivery cost is the cost of operating a truck
to a zone in the city center. The storage cost, on the other
hand, is the cost of storing a unit volume of delivery order
overnight in the UCCs’ warehouse. With these costs known,
their proposed mechanism ensures the budget balance on the
resulting allocation.
While maximizing the UCC’s profit ensures economic sus-
tainability, it should be noted that the establishments of UCC,
especially under government pilot runs, are aimed at achieving
environmental sustainability. Inspired by this, we propose, in
this paper, a bicriteria auction for the UCCs to achieve both
economic and environmental sustainabilities.
In this paper, our goal is neither to design simultaneous auc-
tion mechanisms with desirable properties (such as incentive
compatibility), nor to investigate if the auction mechanisms
in place have such properties, nor to characterize equilibrium
strategies of carriers in such auctions. Rather, we are interested
in demonstrating the viability of auctions, which produce the
twin outcome of economic and environmental sustainabilities.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
1) We identify three determining factors from the UCC
operation, which contribute to the environmental sus-
tainability.
2) We formulate the winner determination problem of the
bicriteria auction as a biobjective program.
3) We present an iterative algorithm to systematically pop-
ulate the Pareto frontier of the bicriteria auction.
4) We study the efficacy of the proposed bicriteria auction
computationally and assess the effects of the carriers’
willingness to share their cost savings to the success of
the proposed auction scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents a brief literature review on logistics and
multiattribute auctions. Section III establishes the UCC prob-
lem addressed in this paper. Section IV details the proposed
bicriteria auction as a plausible solution to the problem.
Section V assesses the efficacy of the proposed solution.
Finally, Section VI concludes this paper and presents future
research directions.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Auctions have been commonly used as the mechanisms
for resource allocation in transportation and logistics—
particularly, in the context of global logistics. Suppliers submit
ad hoc delivery demands and their budgets to get these
demands served. Carriers submit their spare capacities in their
truck fleet and the cost of using these spare capacities in the
reverse auction. In some platforms, we see bipartite auctions,
where both carriers and suppliers function as bidders [6].
Combining different service providers to fulfill transportation
demands can be modeled as set partition problems [7] or
lane covering problems [8], [9]. Several efficient methods for
procurement scheduling can be found in [10], which stud-
ied the liner shipping problem. Reference [11] characterized
the auctions held by distributors and e-commerce companies
for carriers to bid on contracts as combinatorial reversed
procurement auction. In such a contract auction, shippers
as the auctioneer need to estimate their future demands to
procure the service of carriers. These demands are commonly
uncertain, making the decision process a stochastic problem.
Reference [12] studied this uncertainty in winner determina-
tion stage of auctioneer. When a shipper does not have a com-
plete distribution of its demands, auctioneer has to consider the
worst case scenario analysis, which can be done by solving
a robust optimization problem [13]. In the context of the
last-mile logistics, [5] recently proposed a profit-maximizing
auction mechanism to address the economic sustainability of
the UCC.
Many auctions concentrate only on the interests of the
auctioneers, while ignoring those of the bidders. It is observed
when price is the sole priority of the auctioneers. This could
potentially damage the long-term relationships between the
bidders and the auctioneers [14]. As a response, auctions
mechanisms that take nonprice attributes, such as quality and
delivery and payment terms explicitly into consideration, have
been proposed [15]. The A + B auction—also known as
cost/time auction—is a commonly encountered two-attribute
sealed-bid auction for procurement [16]–[20]. The A part
of the equation is the bidder’s cost and the B part is the
estimated time, requiring each bidder to express additional
quantity besides price when joining the auction. A utility/
scoring function then assigns each bid a score, based
on which the bids can then be ranked and the winners
may thus be determined. Commonly used scoring functions
are additive or quasi-linear [21]–[26]. Separately, [27] pre-
sented a biobjective winner determination problem (BO-WDP)
for a combinatorial auction in transportation procurement.
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The two objectives include minimizing the total procurement
costs and maximizing the service-quality level.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this paper, we consider the setting of last-mile deliveries
in a city with Z delivery zones Z = {1, . . . , Z}. We assume
that a delivery operation incurs a cost of δ per unit distance
traveled. In addition, the city authority imposes a tax on the
carbon emission as much as ε per unit emission produced.
We employ the activity-based method outlined in [28] for
computing the carbon footprint for heavy goods vehicles.
When traveling empty, a truck produces γ0 emission. Depend-
ing on its utilization, a truck produces γ0 + ϑγ emission,
where ϑ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the utilization of the truck. For
simplicity of the model presentation, we assume trucks to
be homogeneous and the emission profile of all trucks to be
identical. Since it is difficult to track the utilization of a truck,
when a carrier performs last-mile deliveries to the city on its
own, we assume that the authority imposes a carbon tax based
on full utilization of the truck. Hence, to a carrier, the total
cost of performing the last-mile deliveries to zones Z ⊆ Z is
(Z) = [δ + ε(γ0 + γ )]d(Z), where d(Z) represents the
shortest total distance required to satisfy all demands in Z
from the carrier’s depot (if multiple trucks are required,
d(Z) should be the total distance traveled by all trucks).
We assume that the UCC is located at the outskirt of the
city, and for simplicity, inbound freight into the UCC incurs
no additional inbound travel cost. By not delivering its order
to a zone on its own, a carrier j who requests the UCC to
deliver its order to zone z derives a benefit ς j z . In this paper,
this benefit is conservatively quantified as the lower bound of
its marginal cost savings over all possible combinations of the
remaining zones to which the carrier must deliver. That is
ς j z = min
z⊆Z\{z}
[(z ∪ {z}) − (z)]. (1)
As the use of UCC can cause some inconveniences for indi-
vidual carriers, we define a parameter ω ∈ [0, 1] to quantify
the perceived benefit [which discounts the computed benefit
in (1)]. In other words, a carrier j will utilize UCC’s service
for zone z only if ως j z is higher than the payment requested
by the UCC.
We assume that the UCC adopts a zone-based consolidation,
i.e., each truck delivers only to a particular zone during
each trip. This allows the authority to easily track and audit
the utilization of UCC trucks, and carbon tax can thus be
accurately charged according to the utilization level. This is
in contrast to the full-load carbon tax charged for individual
carrier’s own deliveries.
As argued earlier in Section I, to more effectively allocate
limited UCC capacity to tasks that are more valuable, a more
flexible and effective approach is to use auction markets to
solicit carrier’s desire in utilizing UCC services. In order to
use the UCC service for a delivery order i , a carrier has
to submit a bid in the following format:
bi = [ai , 
i , vi , zi , pi ] (2)
where ai and 
i are arrival and deadline periods, respectively
(the planning horizon is assumed to be T time periods),
vi is the order volume, zi is the destination zone, and pi is the
highest price that the carrier is willing to pay for the order.
In this paper, pi is essentially the perceived benefit ως j zi ,
where j denotes the carrier who owns order i and submits
bid bi . We assume that orders cannot be divided and has to
be satisfied by a single truck. All bids are assumed to be
submitted sealed, and the auction is single round. The case
where the objective of the auction market is to maximize
UCC’s profit has been studied in [5]. A major contribution
as stated earlier is the extension of this market framework to
also consider environmental factor beyond just profits.
An alternative to the auction market will be to charge
carriers with fixed prices. In this paper, a zone-based rate rz ,
which represents per unit volume to deliver to zone z, will be
charged. For simplicity, we can assume that for each order i
satisfying ωςci zi ≥ vi rzi (ci is the carrier owning order i ),
a proxy bid will be placed, with pi = vi rzi . In both allocation
schemes described earlier, the same winner determination
problem (which determines what orders to satisfy, given the
capacity constraint) will be formulated and solved.
IV. FORMULATION AND SOLUTION APPROACH
Our UCC winner determination problem aims to maximize
either the economic or environmental objective by assigning
bids to trucks, while observing fleet and truck capacity con-
straints. Let B = {b1, . . . , bN } be the set of all bids, the
number of time periods be T , the number of UCC trucks be K ,
and the capacity of each truck be Q.
We introduce three groups of binary decision variables:
1) xtik indicates if order i is assigned to truck k in period t;
2) ytkz indicates if truck k is activated to serve zone z in
period t ; and 3) c j represents the need for carrier j to arrange
for its own order deliveries.1 Let B j denote the set of bids put
up by carrier j .
In terms of objective functions, the economic function,
denoted by f1, is a function of the net profit derived from
bid prices of the auction minus operational costs. The envi-
ronmental function is composed of a number of factors, and
in this paper, we consider the total number of trucks (carrier
trucks plus UCC trucks) that eventually carry the last-mile
deliveries, the number of orders consolidated, and the total
consolidated volume. Let f2, f3, and f4, respectively, denote
these quantities.
Let X = {xtik}, Y = {ytkz}, and C = {c j }. Let d(z) denote
the distance traveled from the UCC to zone z and back to the
UCC and h¯ denote the holding cost coefficient (i.e., the rate
for storing an order of unit volume of good for one period in
the UCC). We have
f1(X, Y) =
∑
i,k,t
pi x tik
−
∑
i,k,t
{
h¯vi [t − ai ] + εγ viQ d(zi )
}
xtik
−
∑
k,z,t
{[δ + εγ0]d(z)} ytkz (3)
1In most cases, this is caused by insufficient capacity or low bid prices;
however, certain orders might require private trucks and the use of UCC will
thus be impossible.
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f2(Y, C) =
∑
k,z,t
ytkz +
∑
j
c j (4)
f3(X) =
∑
i,k,t
x tik (5)
f4(X) =
∑
i,k,t
vi x
t
ik . (6)
The net profit f1 is the total payment received by the UCC
(first term) minus the total operational cost, which is made up
of the cost for consolidating order i into truck k at period t
(second term) and the cost for sending truck k to zone z at
period t (third term). The function f2 is simply the number
of trucks activated by the UCC over the period [1, T ] plus
the number of carrier trucks, which deliver some orders to
the city on their own. The other two functions f3 and f4 are
self-explanatory.
Now to quantify the environmental function, we need to
combine its three influential factors f2– f4. In practice, the
ultimate goal of consolidation is to minimize the number of
trucks f2, since ultimately, carbon emission is associated with
the number of trucks used. Second, the number of orders con-
solidated also plays a role in reducing carbon emission, since
orders that are otherwise not consolidated will be delivered
by carriers’ trucks, which will likely be less than truckload.
Hence, in this paper, we propose a weighted sum of these
factors N f2(Y, C)− f3(X)− (1/V ) f4(X), where the weights
are defined as N = |B| and V = ∑i vi .
Finally, we discuss the constraints associated with our
model. In order to account for the utilization of the carriers’
own trucks in the model [see (4), which counts the total
number of trucks used eventually], we need an indicator
variable to specify if a carrier intends to still visit the city
when all its bidded orders are accepted for delivery by the
UCC. We denote this as I j , where I j = 1 if carrier j still
intends to visit the city, and 0 otherwise. And for simplicity, we
assume that each carrier owns a single truck in the formulation,
although this can be readily relaxed by distinguishing the
carrier index from their truck indices.
Hence, the constraints are defined as follows:
xtik = 0 ∀i∀k∀t /∈ [ai , 
i ] (7)∑
k,t
x tik ≤ 1 ∀i (8)
∑
z
ytkz ≤ 1 ∀k∀t (9)
xtik ≤ ytkzi ∀i∀k∀t (10)
c j ≥ I j ∀ j (11)
1 −
∑
k,t
x tik ≤ c j ∀ j ∀i ∈ B j (12)
I j + |B j | −
∑
i∈B j ,k,t
x tik ≥ c j ∀ j (13)
∑
i
vi x
t
ik ≤ Q ∀k∀t . (14)
Constraint (7) eliminates impossible consolidation.
Constraint (8) ensures the UCC only consolidates an order at
most once. Constraint (9) enforces single zone consolidation.
Algorithm 1. Approximating Pareto Frontier to BO-WDP
1: set P = −∞
2: set M = K T
3: solve [X, Y, C] = BO-WDP(M, P)
4: while not infeasible do
5: add [X, Y, C] to Pareto set F
6: set P = f1(X, Y)
7: set M = ∑k,z,t ytkz − 1
8: solve [X, Y, C] = BO-WDP(M, P)
9: end while
10: return F
Constraint (10) relates the consolidation of an order with
the activation of a truck. Constraints (11)–(13) govern the
deactivation of a carrier. A truck is said to be deactivated
if the associated carrier no longer need to enter the city
(by having all its orders delivered by the UCC). Note that
when I j = 1, these constraints require c j = 1, thereby
disallowing the deactivation. Finally, (14) is the capacity
constraint.
We now propose our method to solve the BO-WDP. First,
we solve the following problem that maximizes the environ-
mental sustainability. That is
arg min
X,Y,C
[
N f2(Y, C) − f3(X) − 1V f4(X)
]
(15)
subject to (7)–(14) and
∑
k,z,t
ytkz ≤ M (16)
f1(X, Y) ≥ P. (17)
Then, we assign X′ = X and Y′ = Y, and next, we solve the
following problem that maximizes economic sustainability:
arg max
X,Y
f1(X, Y) (18)
subject to (7)–(14), (16), and
f2(Y, C) = f2(Y′, C) (19)
f3(X) = f3(X′) (20)
f4(X) = f4(X′). (21)
By appropriately setting different M and P values and
repeating the above-mentioned procedure, Algorithm 1 out-
lines the procedure to systematically obtain the approximate
Pareto frontier to BO-WDP.
We note that it is theoretically possible to obtain the other
approximate Pareto frontier by reversing the direction in
Algorithm 1 and exchanging the precedence of the
optimization criteria with appropriate changes to con-
straints (16) and (17). However, we consciously avoid such
approach, since the very reason that the UCC is established
is to minimize the negative impacts of the last-mile deliveries
on the environment. Thus, given a threshold on the number
of trucks the UCC can dispatch over the period [1, T ], the
consolidation plan that achieves the highest environmental
sustainability must first be identified and if multiple plans
are available, only then the one that produces the greatest
consolidation profit will have to be singled out.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of Algorithm 1’s performance with increasing number
of activated trucks.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT
In this section, we present a numerical study that illus-
trates the advantages of using market mechanism over the
fixed-charge scheme when both economic and environmental
considerations are important.
A. Experimental Setup
We consider a city with five zones (Z ) and a planning
horizon of five time periods (T ). The UCC of the city owns
a fleet of 5 trucks (K ), each with a capacity of 100 volume
units (Q), and serves 25 carriers (C). The discount factor for
computing perceived benefit (ω) is set to 3/4. The holding
cost (h¯) at the UCC is 0.05 per unit volume per time period.
The base emission (γ0) is set to 0.712, while emission per unit
distance traveled (γ ) is set to 0.333. The cost associated with
per unit distance traveled (δ) is 1, while the carbon tax rate (ε)
is 0.1 per unit emission.
For each carrier, the number of orders (m) follows a
discrete uniform distribution U [1, Z ], with orders serving
distinct zones (each zone with equal probability being cho-
sen). An order is characterized by (ai , di , vi ), where the
deadline di follows a discrete uniform distribution U [1, T ],
the arrival time ai follows a discrete uniform distribution
U [1, di ], and the volume vi follows a discrete uniform distri-
bution U [Q/(5m)+ 1, Q/(m + 1)] (intuitively speaking, total
order volume from a carrier can fill from 20% to 100% of
a truck).
B. Pareto Frontier
The performance of UCC operations with respect to the
number of activated trucks is measured using a number of
metrics and shown in Fig. 1 (to be explained in the next
paragraph). Truck allocation plans at the UCC are generated
by executing Algorithm 1. As our market cleaning algorithm
is biobjective, a Pareto frontier is necessary to illustrate the
tradeoff between economic and environmental considerations.
One such Pareto frontier is shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Pareto frontier of the auction mechanism.
The impact of UCC is measured by two groups of con-
flicting metrics: economic one and environmental ones. The
economic metric is measured by UCC’s profit, and it shows
how viable it is to operate a UCC (a negative UCC profit
implies that subsidies are needed). To allow the performance
comparison across different scenarios, we normalize UCC
profit over the total cost of operation without UCC. On the
other hand, environmental sustainability is multifaceted and
we use the following metrics to provide a more complete view
on UCC’s environmental impact.
1) Total Truck Reduction: Without UCC, all carriers will
need to utilize their own trucks to make deliveries.
With UCC, the number of activated trucks is optimized
as f2(·). Therefore, the reduction in the number of trucks
is simply C − f2(·).
2) Orders Consolidated: Essentially f3(·).
3) Volume Consolidated: Essentially f4(·).
4) Carriers Not Delivering: Essentially ∑ j (1 − c j ), indi-
cating the number of carriers whose orders are fully
served by UCC.
5) Distance and Emission Reductions: The decrease in
distance/emission after the introduction of UCC.
6) Carrier’s Savings: For a carrier, its saving due to UCC
is computed by finding the difference between (variable)
costs paid to deliver all orders on its own (which include
distance and emission charges) and total costs with UCC
in operation, which include both amount paid to UCC
and costs for making its own deliveries.
Note that all above metrics are normalized to ensure compara-
bility. Normalizations are done over the original system-wide
values without UCC (i.e., all carriers have to make deliveries
on their own).
As expected, environmental sustainability can be improved
by increasing UCC fleet size; in our scenario, when 13
trucks are deployed, almost all orders can be served by the
UCC (97.83% of orders and 98.23% of total volume can
be, respectively, served). On the other hand, we can see that
a smaller fleet size is actually better for the UCC operator
in terms of profits earned, as profits continue to fall as UCC
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Fig. 3. Fixed-rate mechanism with different values of ϑ . Comparison of Algorithm 1’s performance with increasing number of activated trucks.
fleet size expands. If we choose to maximize only UCC profits,
only three trucks would be deployed, resulting in the highest
profit, yet only serving 30.43% of orders and 26.50% of total
volume.
The conflict between economic and environmental objec-
tives is what motivates us to introduce the Pareto frontier.
By having a Pareto frontier, such as the one shown in Fig. 2,
we can present to the decision maker a wide selection of
potential policies, with tradeoffs clearly illustrated. It then
depends completely on individual decision makers to balance
these two conflicting goals. Although not explicitly pointed
out, all the points in Fig. 2 are produced by executing
Algorithm 1, which places the decreasing limits on the UCC
fleet size in the successive iteration.
C. Auction Versus Fixed-Rate Mechanism
As discussed earlier, fixed-rate mechanisms (i.e., zone-
specific rate rz is used in place of pi ) are most commonly
used among existing UCC operations. We are thus interested
in quantifying the potential benefits of using auction market
in place of fixed-rate mechanism.
To explore wider ranges of pricing schemes, we intro-
duce a pricing coefficient ϑ ∈ (0, 1] and compute rz as
follows:
rz = 1
ϑ Q [δ + ε(γ0 + ϑγ )]d(z). (22)
Intuitively speaking, ϑ represents the anticipated utilization
level of UCC trucks (in other words, ϑ can be seen as a
measure on how optimistic/pessimistic the UCC is). The unit-
volume rate is then designed to ensure that the collected
revenues from carriers are sufficient to cover the costs associ-
ated with deployed trucks (higher ϑ implies more optimistic
expectation, and will result in lower rate).
Besides this difference in determining price, the decision
rules for individual carriers are exactly the same: a carrier
j will outsource the delivery of its order i to UCC if the
perceived benefit is greater than the charged price, that is
ως jzi ≥ vi rzi .
To see the impact of ϑ in carrier participation, we try to
set ϑ to 1/2, 3/4, and 5/6, and observe the percentages of
orders outsourced (i.e., submitted as bids to the UCC) to be
15.22%, 33.70%, and 39.13%, respectively. On the other hand,
as carriers are free to name their prices in the auction market,
the participation is always 100% (of course, not all submitted
bids are accepted).
We try to visualize the performance of fixed-rate mech-
anism, as shown in Figs. 1 and 2. In Fig. 3, we plot the
performance of the mechanism over increasing fleet size, under
different values of ϑ . Although UCC still can make a profit
in most cases, it is much lower than the auction mechanism.
Also, all metrics related to environmental sustainability also
deteriorate significantly. This is mainly due to the fact that
the participation ratio is much lower, and as a result, almost
all carriers still need to dispatch their own trucks, resulting
in zero reduction in truck deployment. Although almost all
carrier trucks still need to be deployed, we still manage to
see some nontrivial carrier savings (although they are much
lower than what is possible with auction markets). This is
mostly due to the fact that carriers can outsource the orders
to the UCC if those destinations would induce significant
detours.
The tradeoffs between economic and environmental sus-
tainabilities are shown in Fig. 4. The resulting plots
are consistent with our previous findings, which show
the UCC profit (economic sustainability suffers the most
drops, while environmental benefits are also negatively
impacted).
In both Figs. 3 and 4, we can see that the value of
ϑ can greatly affect the effectiveness of UCC. Of all the
values (1/2, 3/4, and 5/6), setting ϑ to 3/4 seems to be the
best choice as it balances both economic and environmental
considerations. Setting ϑ any lower, UCC will activate less
trucks, thus significantly reduce the environmental benefits.
Setting ϑ higher will bring in higher environmental benefits;
however, almost all fleet size (except for the fleet size 3) will
incur losses.
These observations highlight one of the major weakness of
fixed-rate mechanism: the difficulty in setting the right price.
As fixed rates are not carrier specific, and depend on carrier’s
orders, it is not straightforward how to optimally set the right
price centrally. On the other hand, auction mechanism, allows
all carriers to participate and name their own prices, thus
significantly increases market participation, making it much
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Fig. 4. Pareto frontier of the fixed-rate mechanism with different values of ϑ .
Fig. 5. Comparison of Algorithm 1’s performance for the auction mechanism with different values of ω.
Fig. 6. Pareto frontier of the auction mechanism with different values of ω.
easily to identify a match and allow carrier-specific pricing by
construction.
D. Sensitivity Analysis
Finally, for the auction mechanism, we want to explore the
impact of discount parameter (ω used in computing perceived
benefit) on UCC operations. In Sections V-A, V-B, and V-C, ω
is set to be 3/4; in this section, we rerun the numerical exper-
iments by setting ω to 2/3 and 4/5, respectively (illustrating
the impact of decreasing and increasing ω). Two classes of
similar figures are plotted, as shown in Figs. 5 and 6.
Intuitively speaking, the higher the value of ω, the higher
the perceived benefit. As a result, by setting ω high (low),
carriers would be more (less) likely to utilize UCC services,
which would directly impact UCC’s profits as well. This can
be clearly shown in Fig. 5. On the other hand, carrier’s saving,
moves in the opposite direction of ω, i.e., as ω increases
(decreases), carrier’s saving should decreases (increases).
In other words, if carriers are more open to using UCC, they
will end up saving less.
However, the above observation is only valid if UCC is
designed to only maximize its own profit. If UCC is instructed
to instead pursue environmental objective without losing
money, the conclusion is actually reversed. When ω is set to
2/3, the UCC can dispatch up to eight trucks profitably, saving
up to 44.8% of carrier costs. When ω is set to 3/4, the UCC
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can dispatch up to 11 trucks profitably, saving up to 59.5%
of carrier costs. Finally, when ω is set to 4/5, the UCC can
dispatch up to 13 trucks profitably, saving up to 62.3% of
carrier costs. In other words, if a UCC is operated in a self-
sustaining and nonprofit way (not maximizing for profit, yet
not losing money either), encouraging carrier participation
can actually improve both carrier savings and environmental
sustainability.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a bicriteria auction for operating
a UCC that aims to achieve both economic and environ-
mental sustainabilities. We first define means in quantifying
environmental sustainability. We then develop a biobjective
optimization model as the winner determination problem for
the auction. Finally, we present a procedure to systematically
construct the Pareto frontier for this model by solving the
biobjective optimization problem multiple times, while incre-
mentally adjusting the fleet size and the lower bound on the
earned profit. Through the empirical study, we demonstrate
that the proposed auction is dominantly more effective than the
fixed-rate mechanism. We further our study by conducting the
sensitivity analysis on the carriers’ willingness to participate
in the UCC operation. We demonstrate that if UCC is non-
profit seeking, yet staying self-sustained, higher willingness
is favorable toward achieving greater good for all: achieving
higher environmental sustainability, helping carriers to save
more, while making sure that the operation of UCC does not
incur losses.
Moving forward, we aim to address the problem of pro-
viding proper incentives to carriers so that bidding their true
benefits is in their best interests. We also intend to study the
adoption of combinatorial auction in the UCC context. Last but
not least, we aim to develop good heuristics to allow scaling
up the proposed biobjective winner determination program and
solve it in a time-efficient manner.
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